Docs · Topic
Privacy and security
Moshpit has no user accounts, no analytics, no crash-reporting SDKs, and no advertising trackers. Its App Store privacy label is Data Not Collected.
What is stored where
Section titled “What is stored where”| Data | Where it lives |
|---|---|
| Passwords, SSH private keys, and push pairing secrets | Stored in the iOS Keychain on your device—and inside the hardware Secure Enclave when you generate a Secure Enclave key. Private keys never leave your device; passwords and signatures go only to the SSH servers you configure. |
| Saved hosts, trusted host keys, themes, and shortcuts | Stored locally on your device. |
| Terminal bytes | Encrypted in transit directly between your device and your servers over SSH or Mosh (AES-128-OCB3), never routed through our servers. |
| Voice input | Transcribed strictly on your device. Downloading an optional local model fetches static weights from Hugging Face (huggingface.co) without sending audio, transcripts, or identifiers. |
What the push relay sees (and cannot see)
Section titled “What the push relay sees (and cannot see)”iOS can wake a closed app only through an Apple Push Notification signed with the app’s Apple Developer Team key. Moshpit operates one stateless Go service (push-relay/) for that single job:
- Ciphertext only: before leaving your host,
~/.moshpit/moshpit-push.shencrypts and authenticates (AES-256-CBC+HMAC-SHA256) the host label, session, pane, agent, and prompt text with a per-connection secret stored only on your phone and in~/.moshpit/push.d/<connection-id>.conf(0600). Neither the relay nor Apple can decrypt it; decryption happens inside the notification service extension on your phone. - No device database: the relay stores nothing on disk. Each send carries its routing metadata and an expiring HMAC token verified by recomputation.
- Shared multi-user Linux caveat: while sending, portable
shpasses the derived encryption subkey toopensslvia command-line arguments, which are briefly readable in/proc/<pid>/cmdlineby other local users on a shared Linux machine unless/procis mounted withhidepid=2. Do not pair hosts you share with untrusted local users.
Running your own relay
Section titled “Running your own relay”Because APNs binds push credentials to an Apple Developer Team ID and bundle identifier, App Store builds can only receive pushes signed for Moshpit’s bundle ID. If you build Moshpit from source under your own Team ID, you can deploy push-relay/ yourself (pure Go standard library, configured with MOSHPIT_APNS_KEY_FILE, MOSHPIT_APNS_KEY_ID, MOSHPIT_APNS_TEAM_ID, and MOSHPIT_RELAY_HMAC_SECRET) and point AppSettings.pushRelayURL at your instance. Full protocol and deployment documentation lives in docs/PUSH.md.
Open source and reporting security issues
Section titled “Open source and reporting security issues”Moshpit—the iOS app, Rust core, host scripts, and push-relay/—is free software released under GPL-3.0-only at github.com/Cluas/moshpit.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability. Email cluas@live.cn with a description, reproduction steps, and your app and iOS versions as outlined in SECURITY.md.